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The upheaval of May 1968 in France challenged not only established institutions, but established modes of thought. Film criticism under the impact of the May events, of ideas developed by Althusser in his work on Marx, and by a new school of structuralist thought in linguistics and anthropology, became increasingly political, Marxist and intellectually rigorous in its approach to film.

In January 1969 Cinéthique began to publish as an explicitly Marxist-Leninist film review. And later in the same year Cahiers du Cinéma, possibly the most important film review of the post-war years, broke with its past and defined for itself a new critical stance — Marxist, political, scientific — but one different from that adopted by Cinéthique.

The differences between the two reviews provoked serious critical and theoretical debate about the relationship of film to ideology, the cultural role of film, the means of its production and the nature of political cinema. This debate has produced important new ideas about the function and direction of film criticism and represents a new critical departure not yet fully absorbed or even fully known in England.

In this issue Screen is reprinting the first part of a Cahiers editorial * (October-November 1969, Nos 216, 217) relevant to their taking of a new position and to their differences with Cinéthique. In future issues of Screen it is hoped to publish further material from both those French film reviews in order to provide readers with a full discussion of the ideas and issues involved.

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Scientific criticism has an obligation to define its field and methods. This implies awareness of its own historical and social situation, a rigorous analysis of the proposed field of study, the conditions which make the work necessary and those which make it possible, and the special function it intends to fulfil.

It is essential that we at *Cahiers du Cinéma* should now undertake just such a global analysis of our position and aims. Not that we are starting entirely from zero. Fragments of such an analysis have been coming out of material we have published recently (articles, editorials, debates, answers to readers' letters) but in an imprecise form and as if by accident. They are an indication that our readers, just as much as we ourselves, feel the need for a clear theoretical base to which to relate our critical practice and its field, taking the two to be indivisible. 'Programmes' and 'revolutionary' plans and declarations tend to become an end in themselves. This is a trap we intend to avoid. Our objective is not to reflect upon what we 'want' (would like) to do, but upon what we *are* doing and what we *can* do, and this is impossible without an analysis of the present situation.

1. *WHERE?*

(a) First, our situation. *Cahiers* is a group of people working together; one of the results of our work appearing as a magazine. A magazine, that is to say, a particular product, involving a particular amount of work (on the part of those who write it, those who produce it and, indeed, those who read it). We do not close our eyes to the fact that a product of this nature is situated fairly and squarely inside the economic system of capitalist publishing (modes of production, spheres of circulation, etc). In any case it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise today, unless one is led astray by Utopian ideas of working 'parallel' to the system. The first step in the latter approach is always the paradoxical one of setting up a false front, a 'neo-system' alongside the system from which one is attempting to escape, in the fond belief that it will be able to negate the system. In fact all it can do is reject it (idealist purism) and consequently it is very soon jeopardized by the enemy upon which it modelled itself. This 'parallelism' works from one direction only. It touches only one side of the wound, whereas we believe that both sides have to be worked upon. And the danger of the parallels meeting all too speedily in infinity seems to us sufficient to argue that we had better stay in the finite and allow them to remain apart.

This assumed, the question is: what is our attitude to our situation? In France the majority of films, like the majority of books and magazines, are produced and distributed by the capitalist economic system and within the dominant ideology. Indeed, strictly speaking all are, whatever expedi-
ent they adopt to try and get around it. This being so, the question we have to ask is: which films, books and magazines allow the ideology a free, unhampered passage, transmit it with crystal clarity, serve as its chosen language? And which attempt to make it turn back and reflect itself, intercept it and make it visible by revealing its mechanisms, by blocking them?

(b) For the situation in which we are acting is the field of cinema (Cahiers is a film magazine),3 and the precise object of our study is the history of a film: how it is produced, manufactured, distributed,4 understood.

What is the film today? This is the relevant question; not, as it possibly once was: what is the cinema? We shall not be able to ask that again until a body of knowledge, of theory, has been evolved (a process to which we certainly intend to contribute) to inform what is at present an empty term, with a concept. For a film magazine the question is also: what work is to be done in the field constituted by films? And for Cahiers in particular: what is our specific function in this field? What is to distinguish us from other film magazines’?

II. THE FILMS

What is a film? On the one hand it is a particular product, manufactured within a given system of economic relations, and involving labour (which appears to the capitalist as money) to produce — a condition to which even ‘independent’ film makers and the ‘new cinema’ are subject — assembling a certain number of workers for this purpose (even the director, whether he is Moullet or Oury, is in the last analysis only a film worker). It becomes transformed into a commodity, possessing exchange value, which is realized by the sale of tickets and contracts, and governed by the laws of the market. On the other hand, as a result of being a material product of the system, it is also an ideological product of the system, which in France means capitalism.5

No film-maker can, by his own individual efforts, change the economic relations governing the manufacture and distribution of his films. (It cannot be pointed out too often that even film-makers who set out to be ‘revolutionary’ on the level of message and form cannot effect any swift or radical change in the economic system — deform it, yes, deflect it, but not negate it or seriously upset its structure. Godard’s recent statement to the effect that he wants to stop working in the ‘system’ takes no account of the fact that any other system is bound to be a reflection of the one he wishes to avoid. The money no longer comes from the Champs-Elysées but from London, Rome or New York. The film may not be marketed by the distribution monopolies but it is shot on film stock from another monopoly — Kodak.) Because every film is
part of the economic system it is also a part of the ideological system, for 'cinema' and 'art' are branches of ideology. None can escape: somewhere, like pieces in a jigsaw, all have their own allotted place. The system is blind to its own nature, but in spite of that, indeed because of that, when all the pieces are fitted together they give a very clear picture. But this does not mean that every film-maker plays a similar role. Reactions differ.

It is the job of criticism to see where they differ, and slowly, patiently, not expecting any magical transformations to take place at the wave of a slogan, to help change the ideology which conditions them.

A few points, which we shall return to in greater detail later: *every film is political*, inasmuch as it is determined by the ideology which produces it (or within which it is produced, which stems from the same thing). The cinema is all the more thoroughly and completely determined because unlike other arts or ideological systems its very manufacture mobilizes powerful economic forces in a way that the production of literature (which becomes the commodity 'books', does not — though once we reach the level of distribution, publicity and sale, the two are in rather the same position.

Clearly, the cinema 'reproduces' reality: this is what a camera and film stock are for — so says the ideology. But the tools and techniques of film-making are a part of 'reality' themselves, and furthermore 'reality' is nothing but an expression of the prevailing ideology. Seen in this light, the classic theory of cinema that the camera is an impartial instrument which grasps, or rather is impregnated by, the world in its 'concrete reality' is an eminently reactionary one. What the camera in fact registers is the vague, unformulated, untheorized, unthought-out world of the dominant ideology. Cinema is one of the languages through which the world communicates itself to itself. They constitute its ideology for they reproduce the world as it is experienced when filtered through the ideology. (As Althusser defines it, more precisely: 'Ideologies are perceived-accepted-suffered cultural objects, which work fundamentally on men by a process they do not understand. What men express in their ideologies is not their true relation to their conditions of existence, but how they react to their conditions of existence; which presupposes a real relationship and an imaginary relationship...') So, when we set out to make a film, from the very first shot, we are encumbered by the necessity of reproducing things not as they really are but as they appear when refracted through the ideology. This includes every stage in the process of production: subjects, 'styles', forms, meanings, narrative traditions; all underline the general ideological discourse. The film is ideology present-}


of ideology, we can see that the film-maker’s first task is to show up the cinema’s so-called ‘depiction of reality’. If he can do so there is a chance that we will be able to disrupt or possibly even sever the connection between the cinema and its ideological function.

The vital distinction between films today is whether they do this or whether they do not.

(a) The first and largest category comprises those films which are imbued through and through with the dominant ideology in pure and unadulterated form, and give no indication that their makers were even aware of the fact. We are not just talking about so-called ‘commercial’ films. The majority of films in all categories are the unconscious instruments of the ideology which produces them. Whether the film is ‘commercial’ or ‘ambitious’, ‘modern’ or ‘traditional’, whether it is the type that gets shown in art houses, or in smart cinemas, whether it belongs to the ‘old’ cinema or the ‘young’ cinema, it is most likely to be a re-hash of the same old ideology. For all films are commodities and therefore objects of trade, even those whose discourse is explicitly political — which is why a rigorous definition of what constitutes ‘political’ cinema is called for at this moment when it is being widely promoted. This merging of ideology and film is reflected in the first instance by the fact that audience demand and economic response have also been reduced to one and the same thing. In direct continuity with political practice, ideological practice reformulates the social need and backs it up with a discourse. This is not a hypothesis, but a scientifically-established fact. The ideology is talking to itself; it has all the answers ready before it asks the questions. Certainly there is such a thing as public demand, but ‘what the public wants’ means ‘what the dominant ideology wants’.

The notion of a public and its tastes was created by the ideology to justify and perpetuate itself. And this public can only express itself via the thought-patterns of the ideology. The whole thing is a closed circuit, endlessly repeating the same illusion.

The situation is the same at the level of artistic form. These films totally accept the established system of depicting reality: ‘bourgeois realism’ and the whole conservative box of tricks: blind faith in ‘life’, ‘humanism’, ‘common sense’ etc. A blissful ignorance that there might be something wrong with this whole concept of ‘depiction’ appears to have reigned at every stage in their production, so much so, that to us it appears a more accurate gauge of pictures in the ‘commercial’ category than box-office returns. Nothing in these films jars against the ideology, or the audience’s mystification by it. They are very reassuring for audiences for there is no difference between the ideology they meet every day and the ideology on the screen. It would be a useful complementary task for film critics to look into the way the ideological system and its
products merge at all levels: to study the phenomenon whereby a film being shown to an audience becomes a monologue, in which the ideology talks to itself, by examining the success of films by, for instance, Melville, Oury and Lelouch.

(b) A second category is that of films which attack their ideological assimilation on two fronts. Firstly, by direct political action, on the level of the 'signified', i.e. they deal with a directly political subject. 'Deal with' is here intended in an active sense: they do not just discuss an issue, reiterate it, paraphrase it, but use it to attack the ideology (this presupposes a theoretical activity which is the direct opposite of the ideological one). This act only becomes politically effective if it is linked with a breaking down of the traditional way of depicting reality. On the level of form, *Unreconciled, The Edge* and *Earth in Revolt* all challenge the concept of 'depiction' and mark a break with the tradition embodying it.

We would stress that only action on both fronts, 'signified' and 'signifiers'¹ has any hope of operating against the prevailing ideology. Economic/political and formal action have to be indissolubly wedded.

(c) 'There is another category in which the same double action operates, but 'against the grain'. The content is not explicitly political, but in some way becomes so through the criticism practised on it through its form.² To this category belong *Méditerranée, The Bellboy, Persona*. . . . For *Cabiers* these films (b and c) constitute the essential in the cinema, and should be the chief subject of the magazine.

(d) Fourth case: those films, increasingly numerous today, which have an explicitly political content (*Z* is not the best example as its presentation of politics is unremittingly ideological from first to last; a better example would be *Le Temps de Vivre*) but which do not effectively criticize the ideological system in which they are embedded because they unquestioningly adopt its language and its imagery.

This makes it important for critics to examine the effectiveness of the political criticism intended by these films. Do they express, reinforce, strengthen the very thing they set out to denounce? Are they caught in the system they wish to break down . . . ? (see a)

(e) Five: films which seem at first sight to belong firmly within the ideology and to be completely under its sway, but which turn out to be so only in an ambiguous manner. For though they start from a non-progressive standpoint, ranging from the frankly reactionary through the conciliatory to the mildly critical, they have been worked upon, and work, in such a real way that there is a noticeable gap, a dislocation, between the starting point and the finished product. We disregard here

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¹ 'Signified' refers to the content or subject of a film, while 'signifiers' refer to the formal elements or the way the content is presented.

² 'Against the grain' refers to films that deviate from the traditional ways of depicting reality.
the inconsistent — and unimportant — sector of films in which the
director makes a conscious use of the prevailing ideology, but leaves it
absolutely straight. The films we are talking about throw up obstacles
in the way of the ideology, causing it to swerve and get off course. The
cinematic framework lets us see it, but also shows it up and denounces
it. Looking at the framework one can see two moments in it: one—hold-
ing it back within certain limits, one transgressing them. An internal
criticism is taking place which cracks the film apart at the seams. If one
reads the film obliquely, looking for symptoms; if one looks beyond its
apparent formal coherence, one can see that it is riddled with cracks: it
is splitting under an internal tension which is simply not there in an
ideologically innocuous film. The ideology thus becomes subordinate to
the text. It no longer has an independent existence: it is presented by
the film. This is the case in many Hollywood films for example, which
while being completely integrated in the system and the ideology end
up by partially dismantling the system from within. We must find out
what makes it possible for a film-maker to corrode the ideology by re-
stating it in the terms of his film: if he sees his film simply as a blow in
favour of liberalism, it will be recuperated instantly by the ideology; if,
on the other hand, he conceives and realizes it on the deeper level of
imagery, there is a chance that it will turn out to be more disruptive.
Not, of course, that he will be able to break the ideology itself, but
simply its reflection in his film. (The films of Ford, Dreyer, Rossellini,
for example.)

Our position with regard to this category of films is: that we have
absolutely no intention of joining the current witch-hunt against them.
They are the mythology of their own myths. They criticize themselves,
even if no such intention is written into the script, and it is irrelevant
and impertinent to do so for them. All we want to do is to show the
process in action.

(f) Films of the ‘live cinema’ (cinéma direct) variety, group one (the
larger of the two groups). These are films arising out of political (or, it
would probably be more exact to say: social) events or reflections, but
which make no clear differentiation between themselves and the non-
political cinema because they do not challenge the cinema’s traditional,
ideologically-conditioned method of ‘depiction’. For instance a miner’s
strike will be filmed in the same style as Les Grandes Familles. The
makers of these films suffer under the primary and fundamental illusion
that if they once break off the ideological filter of narrative traditions
(dramaturgy, construction, domination of the component parts by a
central idea, emphasis on formal beauty) reality will then yield itself up
in its true form. The fact is that by doing so they only break off one
filter, and not the most important one at that. For reality holds within

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itself no hidden kernel of self-understanding, of theory, of truth, like a stone inside a fruit. We have to manufacture those. (Marxism is very clear on this point, in its distinction between 'real' and 'perceived' objects.) Cf *Chiefs* (Leacock and a good number of the May films).

This is why supporters of *cinéma direct* resort to the same idealist terminology to express its role and justify its successes as others use about products of the greatest artifice: 'accuracy', 'a sense of lived experience', 'flashes of intense truth', 'moments caught live', 'abolition of all sense that we are watching a film ' and finally: fascination. It is that magical notion of 'seeing is understanding': ideology goes on display to prevent itself from being shown up for what it really is, contemplates itself but does not criticize itself.

(g) The other kind of 'live cinema'. Here the director is not satisfied with the idea of the camera 'seeing through appearances', but attacks the basic problem of depiction by giving an active role to the concrete stuff of his film. It then becomes productive of meaning and is not just a passive receptacle for meaning produced outside it (in the ideology): *La Règle du Jour*, *La Rentrée des Usines Wonder*.

**III. CRITICAL FUNCTION**

Such, then, is the field of our critical activity: these films, within the ideology, and their different relations to it. From this precisely defined field spring four functions: (1) in the case of the films in category (a): show what they are blind to; how they are totally determined, moulded, by the ideology; (2) in the case of those in categories (b), (c) and (g), read them on two levels, showing how the films operate critically on the level of signified and signifiers; (3) in the case of those of types (d) and (f), show how the signified (political subject matter) is always weakened, rendered harmless, by the absence of technical/theoretical work on the signifiers; (4) in the case of those in group (e) point out the gap produced between film and ideology by the way the films work, and show how they work.

There can be no room in our critical practice either for speculation (commentary, interpretation, de-coding even) or for spacious raving (of the film-columnist variety). It must be a rigidly factual analysis of what governs the production of a film (economic circumstances, ideology, demand and response) and the meanings and forms appearing in it, which are equally tangible.

The tradition of frivolous and evanescent writing on the cinema is as tenacious as it is prolific, and film analysis today is still massively predetermined by idealistic presuppositions. It wanders farther abroad today, but its method is still basically empirical. It has been through a necessary stage of going back to the material elements of a film, its
signifying structures, its formal organization. The first steps here were undeniably taken by André Bazin, despite the contradictions than can be picked out in his articles. Then followed the approach based on structural linguistics (in which there are two basic traps, which we fell into — phenomenological positivism and mechanistic materialism). As surely as criticism had to go through this stage, it has to go beyond. To us, the only possible line of advance seems to be to use the theoretical writing of the Russian film-makers of the twenties (Eisenstein above all) to elaborate and apply a critical theory of the cinema, a specific method of apprehending rigorously defined objects, in direct reference to the method of dialectical materialism.

It is hardly necessary to point out that we know that the 'policy' of a magazine cannot — indeed, should not — be corrected by magic overnight. We have to do it patiently, month by month, being careful in our own field to avoid the general error of putting faith in spontaneous change, or attempting to rush in a 'revolution' without the preparation to support it. To start proclaiming at this stage that the truth has been revealed to us would be like talking about 'miracles' or 'conversion'. All we should do is to state what work is already in progress and publish articles which relate to it, either explicitly or implicitly.

We should indicate briefly how the various elements in the magazine fit into this perspective. The essential part of the work obviously takes place in the theoretical articles and the criticisms. There is coming to be less and less of a difference between the two, because it is not our concern to add up the merits and defects of current films in the interests of topicality, nor, as one humorous article put it 'to crack up the product'. The interviews, on the other hand, and also the 'diary' columns and the list of films, with the dossiers and supplementary material for possible discussion later, are often stronger on information than theory. It is up to the reader to decide whether these pieces take up any critical stance, and if so, what.

J.-L.C. and J.N.

NOTES

1. Others include distribution, screening and discussion of films in the provinces and the suburbs, sessions of theoretical work (see 'Montage' No 210).
2. Or tolerated, and jeopardized by this very toleration. Is there any need to stress that it is the tried tactic of covertly repressive systems not to harass the protesting fringe? They go out of their way to take no notice of them, with the double effect of making one half of the opposition careful not to try their patience too far and the other half complacent in the knowledge that their activities are unobserved.
3. We do not intend to suggest by this that we want to erect a corporatist fence round our own field, and neglect the infinitely larger field where so much is obviously at stake politically. Simply, we are concentrating on that precise
point of the spectrum of social activity in this article, in response to precise operational needs.

4. A more and more pressing problem. It would be inviting confusion to allow it to be tackled in bits and pieces and obviously we have to make a unified attempt to pose it theoretically later on. For the moment we leave it aside.

5. Capitalist ideology. This term expresses our meaning perfectly, but as we are going to use it without further definition in this article, we should point out that we are not under any illusion that it has some kind of 'abstract essence'. We know that it is historically and socially determined, and that it has multiple forms at any given place and time, and varies from historical period to historical period. Like the whole category of 'militant' cinema, which is totally vague and undefined at present. We must (a) rigorously define the function attributed to it, its aims, its side effects (information, arousal, critical reflection, provocation 'which always has some effect' . . . ); (b) define the exact political line governing the making and screening of these films — 'revolutionary' is too much of a blanket term to serve any useful purpose here; and (c) state whether the supporters of militant cinema are in fact proposing a line of action in which the cinema would become the poor relation, in the illusion that the less the cinematic aspect is worked on, the greater the strength and clarity of the 'militant' effect will be. This would be a way of avoiding the contradictions of 'parallel' cinema and getting embroiled in the problem of deciding whether 'underground' films should be included in the category, on the pretext that their relationship to drugs and sex, their preoccupation with form, might possibly establish new relationships between film and audience.

7. We are not shutting our eyes to the fact that it is an oversimplification (employed here because operationally easier) to make such a sharp distinction between the two terms. This is particularly so in the case of the cinema, where the signified is more often than not a product of the permutations of the signifiers, and the sign has dominance over the meaning.

8. This is not a magical doorway out of the system of 'depiction' (which is particularly dominant in the cinema) but rather a rigorous, detailed, large-scale work on this system — what conditions make it possible, what mechanisms render it innocuous. The method is to draw attention to the system, so that it can be seen for what it is, to make it serve one's own ends, condemn itself out of its own mouth. Tactics employed may include 'turning cinematic syntax upside-down' but it cannot be just that. Any old film nowadays can upset the normal chronological order in the interests of looking vaguely 'modern'. But The Exterminating Angel and The Diary of Anna Magdalena Bach (though we would not wish to set them up as a model) are rigorously chronological without ceasing to be subversive in the way we have been describing, whereas in many a film the mixed-up time sequence simply covers up a basically naturalistic conception. In the same way, perceptual confusion (avowed intent to act on the unconscious mind, changes in the texture of the film, etc) are not sufficient in themselves to get beyond the traditional way of depicting 'reality'. To realize this, one has only to remember the unsuccessful attempts there have been of the 'lettriste' or or new kinds of onomatopoeia. In the one and the other case only the most 'zazum' type to give back its infinity to language by using nonsense words superficial level of language is touched. They create a new code, which operates on the level of the impossible, and has to be rejected on any other, and is therefore not in a position to transgress the normal.

translated by SUSAN BENNETT